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ONE OF the important contributions of the Special Study of Se-
curities Markets' (Special Study) was the change of emphasis
which it effected in the thinking concerning problems related to the
sale of securities to the public. Such thinking had been directed
primarily to devising ways in which more complete and usable
information could be made available to the public investor so that
he would have a basis for making informed and reasoned decisions
about the investment merits of securities. Although it did not mini-
mize the importance of disclosure, the Special Study turned its atten-
tion to the people selling securities because it recognized that often
the salesman is the key to the sale of securities. In its study of the
qualifications of the persons in the securities industry, the Special
Study found 'large gaps and important deficiencies which created
major problems for the protection of the public interest in securities
and the securities markets. Accordingly, it recommended than stan-
dards encompassing competence, character and integrity, and financial
capacity and responsibility be erected for the broker-dealer commu-
nity.2 Congress endorsed the Special Study's conclusions in the Se-
curities Acts Amendments of 19648 (Amendments Act) by including
in that legislation a mandate to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (Commission) and the National Association of Securities
t This article bears a date of May 20, 1965.
* A.B. 1954, LL.B. 1957, Harvard University. Associate Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.
1 SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study].
2 Special Study, pt. 1, at 160.
8 78 Stat. 565 (1964).
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Dealers (NASD) to implement these Special Study recommendations.
Although the policy of restricting free access into the securities busi-
ness which was written into the regulatory scheme by the Amend-
ments Act marked a significant departure from the federal govern-
ment's traditional attitude toward broker-dealer regulation, it
inevitably followed from the conclusion that adequate investor pro-
tection depends to a great extent on the professional attitude and
responsibility of the broker-dealer community.
The decision to encourage the professional aspects of the securi-
ties business has not been without critics. The feeling among these
critics seems to be that a better (or at least a more realistic) approach
would have been to acknowledge that the brokerage business is at
bottom a merchandising business and that its success and contribu-
tions may be unduly restricted by the inhibitions which the obliga-
tions of professionalism inevitably create. These critics would, I
suppose, be willing to call salesmen "salesmen" instead of "registered
representatives" or "account executives," and customers "customers"
instead of "clients." However, the prevailing attitude of the securi-
ties industry-particularly as reflected in its advertising campaigns-
has been an affirmation of the professional nature of the services
rendered by, and the professional quality of, the persons engaged
in the securities business. An example of this theme is furnished by
a recent full-page advertisement in the Wall Street Journal which
featured a confidence-inspiring man standing in front of a stock
board and contained the following text:
When you buy or sell a security or shares in a mutual fund, you
do business with a man like this. In a sense, he is a catalyst, find-
ing places for investors to put their money to work. To some, he's
a stock broker; to others, a securities salesman. His official title
is Registered Representative, which means he is licensed to repre-
sent an investment firm in the buying and selling of securities to
the public.
This is a privilege, not a right. To qualify, he must undergo
special training, then pass a stiff examination and adhere to
stringent rules set up by the Securities and Exchange Commission
and other regulatory bodies.
His specialized knowledge, backed by the research and other
facilities of his company, is at your disposal. How well he serves
you depends largely on how candid you are with him. Discuss
your investment needs with him as frankly as you would discuss
your .legal problems with your lawyer or health matters with your
THE SUITABILITY DOCTRINE
family doctor. Like them, with true professionalism, he knows
that he prospers only as those he serves prosper.4
I do not mean to imply that the segment of the securities industry
which is willing to accept an image of professionalism such as that
implicit in the advertisement described above is necessarily willing
to take on all the obligations of professionalism or eschew the mer-
chandising aspects of the securities business. Indeed, the conflict
between the desire for professionalism and the demands of a business
the primary purpose of which is the sale of securities provides a
dominant theme in securities regulation. 5  One of the principal
areas in which this conflict is taking place concerns the development
of standards requiring a broker-dealer, under certain circumstances,
to make sure that he recommends and sells to his customers only
I Wall Street Journal, Oct. 20, 1964, p. 15. (Emphasis added.) This advertisement
is not alone in analogizing the registered representative to a doctor or lawyer. See
ASSOCIATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE FiRMs, MANUAL FOR REGISTERED REPSENTATIVES A
GUIDE FOR THE OPENING AND CARRYING OF CusroMra' AccouNTs 11 (8th rev. 1963). See
also United States v. Pandolfo, Crim. Nos. 95, 105, D.N.D., Sept. 28, 1959 (testimony
of Harold E. Wood, St. Paul, Minn. investment banker and NASD chairman in 1955-
56). Mr. Wood, who appeared as a government witness, was asked: "Is the securities
business a specialized business or not, in your opinion?" He answered, "I think it is
a profession like medicine or the law," and he went on to say, "I think you have a
fiduciary relationship with your customers which is a position of trust with them,
and that is where it distinguishes it from any other business." Transcript, p. 16.
On cross examination Mr. Wood elaborated:
Some things we won't handle for anybody so we refuse it, and the other is we
won't handle it if we don't think the customer should have the same kind of
security. It is the same thing as the doctor [who] doesn't give the wrong
medicine if a person wants it.
Q. You are not likening the security business to the obligation of a doctor not
to give the wrong medicine to a patient?
A. I am making the comparison that an investment banker has the same
responsibility to a customer as a doctor does to a patient.
Transcript, p. 58.
The Special Study stated that one of the two major themes typical in broker-
dealer advertising is "the theme of reliance and trust in the experience and judgment
of the firm, its registered representatives and, often most particularly, its research
department." Special Study, pt. 1, at 248. It concluded that such advertisements
"may create an atmosphere of trust and confidence, encouraging full reliance on
broker-dealers and their registered representatives as professional advisers in situations
where such reliance is not merited, and obscuring the merchandising aspects of the
retail securities business." Ibid.
Any broad characterization of the tone of the advertising of the broker-dealer
industry may be inaccurate with respect to the advertising policies of particular
firms. Many firms do not emphasize the theme of professionalism in their advertise-
ments and do not try to adorn themselves with the trappings of professionalism.
However, an investor's impression of the nature of the broker-dealer and his business
often derives from the advertising and attitudes of articulate segments of the industry.
For an analysis of professionalism in the securities industry, see Special Study, pt.
1, at 240-42.
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those securities which are suitable for them. This article will
analyze the extent to which these standards have been articulated
and will suggest the outlines of a fully developed standard of respon-
sibility under such a suitability concept.6 The standard which
defines the broker-dealer's responsibilities will sometimes be referred
to as the suitability doctrine.
The impetus underlying the development of this doctrine is not
rooted in a desire to fashion an instrument which can be used to
review a broker-dealer's investment judgment7 or to make the
broker-dealer an insurer of favorable investment performance. Al-
though such a doctrine reflects an attempt to emphasize the demands
of professionalism, it does not seek to do so in a way which disre-
gards the importance of the merchandising aspects of the securities
business. Further, the imposition of certain broker-dealer re-
sponsibilities by a suitability doctrine does not necessarily mean that
failure to live up to such responsibilities will impose civil liability
on the broker-dealer."
The concept of suitability expresses a homely truth about invest-
ing-investment decisions can be made only in light of the goals and
needs of the person for whom they are made. Investors vary with
respect to the degree of risk which they are able and willing to
assume in their investments, and their portfolios should reflect their
differing risk thresholds. Consequently, a security which is suitable
for one investor may be unsuitable for another. It may be suitable
for one investor to have 1,000 shares of XYZ stock, unsuitable for
another investor to have more than 100 shares of such stock, and
0 The development of broker-dealer responsibilities under the suitability concept
is closely related to another development in broker-dealer regulation-the require-
ment that a broker-dealer not make recommendations to his customers unless he
has a reasonable basis for the recommendations and that he disclose known or easily
ascertainable facts bearing upon his recommendations. This aspect of broker-dealer
regulation, which concerns the broker-dealer's knowledge of his merchandise (rather
than his customers), is explored in Cohen & Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice
Standards: The Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29
LAW & CONTEMP. PaoB. 691 (1964) and Comment, Current Problems in Securities
Regulation, 62 MieH. L. R v. 680 (1964) and will not be discussed in this article. This
article also will not discuss the adequacy of various approaches to securities analysis
in identifying the risk element in a particular securities purchase.
7There is no attempt to provide a standard for evaluating various systems of
analyzing securities or the decisions made as a result of such analyses. The doctrine
does not seek to answer a question such as should the broker-dealer have recom-
mended General Motors instead of U.S. Steel.
8 See pages 463-71 infra.
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unsuitable for still another investor to have any such shares. Indeed,
it may be unsuitable for some persons to purchase any securities.
A suitability doctrine imposes a responsibility on the broker-
dealer to take the risk threshold of his customers into account when
he recommends or sells securities to them. This responsibility
applies in two basic situations: (1) when a broker-dealer makes a
recommendation to a customer, and (2) when he sells a security to
a customer without making a recommendation. 9 In broad outline
the suitability doctrine, as it develops, should require that:
1. When a broker-dealer makes a recommendation to a cus-
tomer, he must recommend only those securities which he reason-
ably believes are suitable for the customer-or, to put it another
way, he may not recommend any securities which he knows or
should know would be unsuitable for that customer.
2. Even when the broker-dealer makes no recommendation he
still has a responsibility to determine, on the basis of information
which he has or should have, that the risk aspects of the contem-
plated investment are within the risk threshold of the customer
who is purchasing the security.
The broker-dealer may discharge his responsibility under the suit-
ability doctrine by informing the customer of the risk aspects of the
transaction in a way which will enable the customer, in light of his
individual capabilities, to relate these risks to his risk threshold and
thus make his own determination of suitability. If under these
circumstances the customer wishes to purchase the security, the
broker-dealer can sell it to him even though he does not think it is
within the customer's risk threshold.10
Imposition of any suitability doctrine has a revolutionary flavor,
because it shifts the responsibility for making inappropriate invest-
ment decisions from the customer to the broker-dealer. It does so
in what seems to me the correct belief that disclosure requirements
9The idea that the suitability doctrine extends not only to recommendations
but also to sales goes beyond what has generally been thought to be the reach of the
suitability concept. However, the question what constitutes a recommendation has
never been precisely answered. For example, if a broker-dealer sells a security to a
customer with whom he has had a long-standing relationship, is there an implied
recommendation that the security is not unsuitable for the customer?
10 If the customer refuses to furnish the broker-dealer with information sufficient
to determine the customer's risk threshold, the broker-dealer should not be required
to prevent the customer from purchasing securities which are beyond his risk
threshold. Broker-dealer responsibility under my concept of suitability is discussed
in greater detail on pages 472-77 infra.
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and practices alone have not been wholly effective in protecting the
investor-including protecting him from his own greed."1
The theory on which any doctrine of suitability must rest (and
which limits its applicability) is that customers tend to rely on their
broker-dealer. As indicated previously, the broker-dealer commu-
nity has made the investing public aware that it has the special skills
needed to deal with such intricate merchandise as securities, and
the public has been encouraged to-and has-relied on the
superior skill of the broker-dealer community in its securities trans-
actions. Implementation of the Special Study recommendations
concerning the qualifications of persons permitted to enter the
industry will undoubtedly enhance the professional image of the
broker-dealer community and public reliance on it.
In the spectrum of relations which exist between broker-dealers
and their customers there are some situations in which reliance is
clearly present and some in which it clearly is not. When the broker-
dealer recommends securities to an inexperienced customer, reliance
is usually present. On the other hand, when the broker-dealer
simply serves as an order clerk, there is usually no reliance. There
are many situations in between these extremes involving relatively
sophisticated persons who rely to some extent on the broker-dealer
but who also depend a great deal on their own judgment. The prin-
ciples of the suitability doctrine, as outlined above, place the burden
of guarding against inappropriate investment decisions on the
broker-dealer in these intermediate cases, but they permit him to
shift that burden to the customer.12 The net effect of this aspect of
the doctrine is to make it unnecessary for the customer to prove that
he has relied on the broker-dealer-it raises a presumption that he
has done so in all but the order clerk situation. However, the broker-
dealer can show that in a particular case the customer did not rely
on him and that he was, therefore, relieved of his responsibilities.
Recognition of some broker-dealer responsibility in the suitability
area has been included in the NASD Rules of Fair Practice since the
11 Cf. Philips & Co., 37 S.E.C. 66, 68 (1956).
22 As a practical matter the broker-dealer should endeavor to shift the responsibility
for making the investment decision to his customer, but he should act on the assump-
tion that he has not done so. Consequently, when the broker-dealer thinks that
his customer is purchasing an unsuitable security, it is good practice in most cases
to so inform him. See ASSOCIATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE FIRMs, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 10.
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inception of that organization in 1938. Article III, section 2 of the
Rules of Fair Practice provides that:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange
of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as
to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs.13
The NASD's suitability rule leaves a number of questions unre-
solved. It talks about the recommendation of securities but says
nothing about the sale of securities. It does not explain under
what circumstances the broker-dealer acquires the responsibility
which the rule imposes or under what circumstances he may shift
that responsibility to his customer. It does not indicate whether
the broker-dealer has a duty to obtain information about his cus-
tomer's existing security holdings and his financial situation and
needs, or what his responsibilities are if he is unable to obtain such
information.
The easiest case for applying the rule occurs where the customer
has told the broker-dealer that the money in his account represents
a substantial portion of his life savings, that he is retired, that he
wants an account which stresses stability of principal and produc-
tion of income, that he has had no experience in the market, and
that he is placing complete trust and confidence in the broker-
dealer (and does so), and where the broker then treats the account
as if it were a trading account. The excessive trading cases were
among the earliest decided under the NASD's suitability rule.14
Similarly, if the broker-dealer in this situation recommended and
23 NASD Manual D-5. The New York Stock Exchange also has a rule which seems
to express a suitability concept. It requires general partners and officers who hold
voting stock of member organizations to "use due diligence to learn the essential facts
relative to every customer...." N.Y. Stock Exch. Rule 405 (1), N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE
2405 (1960). This rule, commonly referred to as the "know your customer" rule, ap-
pears to be regarded by the Exchange as primarily for the protection of member organi-
zations against customers who will not meet their financial obligations to the member.
See Special Study, pt. 1, at 289; AssocATION oF STocK ExcHANrE FIRMs, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 13. For a discussion of the New York Stock Exchange's views on the suit-
ability doctrine, see note 52 infra.
21 E.g., R. H. Johnson & Co., 33 S.E.C. 180 (1952). The Commission has treated
excessive trading cases as involving violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws. See, e.g., E. H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C. 347, 880-82 (1945).
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purchased for the account a preponderance of high-risk securities, 5
a violation of the suitability rule would occur. The second case is
different from the first-although perhaps theoretically not more
difficult-because it requires a judgment about the quality of the
security recommended.
In the last few years standards of broker-dealer responsibility
under the suitability concept have expanded beyond this simple
situation. This expansion has been a concomitant to the growing
professional stature of the broker-dealer community' 0 Further, it
is in tune with the growing concern of the law with developing tech-
niques for protecting the purchasing public. For example, the suit-
ability doctrine is a first cousin to the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose imposed by section 2-315 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code on the seller of goods where he has reason to know the
particular purpose for which the goods are acquired and where the
buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing
goods which are suitable for that purpose.' 7  A similar warranty is
also being implied where the sale consists of services.' 8
" The purchase of one or two high risk securities for a portfolio the investment
objective of which is stability of principal and production of income would not
necessarily be improper. Violation of the suitability rule in the purchase of such
securities should depend upon the composition of the whole portfolio as it is known
or should be known to the broker-dealer.
11 The same conclusion was reached in a comment on a case involving the sale of
insurance in which the court used language which foreshadows expansion of the legal
responsibilities of insurance agents: "We do not share the views of those who look
upon this decision with dismay. Agents and companies have spent decades in up-
grading the stature of those who sell and service life insurance. They are rapidly
reaching professional standing, if they have not already done so. The greater the
stature, the greater the correlative duty and responsibility. If we want increased
stature for agents, all of us will have to pay the price that goes with it." DINEEN,
CALLAN & NINNEMAN, REPLACEMENT: CAUSES AND CONTROL 51 (1962). For a discussion
of the case referred to, Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 870
U.S. 915 (1962), see text accompanying notes 28-29 infra.
17 The implied warranty imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code probably does
not apply to securities transactions because it refers to "goods," and investment securi-
ties are specifically excluded from the definition of goods contained in § 2-105 of the
code. However, the comment to § 2-105 states that the exclusion of investment securl.
.ties from the definition of goods is not intended "to prevent the application of a par.
ticular section of this Article by analogy to securities... when the reason of that section
makes such application sensible and the situation is not covered by the Article of this
Act dealing specifically with such securities (Article 8)."
The doctrine of suitability as discussed in this article goes further than the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose-particularly in the duty it places on the
broker-dealer to inquire into the financial needs and resources of his customers.
"See Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co., 275 Ala. 35, 151 So. 2d 767 (1963) (engi-
neers held to warrant impliedly that plans and specifications drawn for drainage of
proposed subdivision would accomplish proper and adequate drainage).
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This expansion has occurred in two kinds of situations. One of
these involves circumstances under which no amount of disclosure
would permit the particular investor to make a reasoned decision
concerning the investment merits of the security. For example, in
a recent Commission decision 19 involving a broker-dealer revocation
proceeding charging wilful violation of the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities laws, the broker-dealer had recommended an invest-
ment in the firm itself to one of its customers who, as the broker-
dealer knew, was seventy-nine years old, retired, living alone and
senile. The firm was at the time in a precarious financial situation,
and the investment involved a substantial risk. The Commission
found that the broker-dealer failed to make "full and meticulous
disclosure of all pertinent information." 20 Although the opinion
could have stopped there in supporting a finding of wilful violation
of the anti-fraud provisions, the Commission went on to say that "in
the context of the circumstances here . . . registrant had an obli-
gation not to recommend a course of action clearly contrary to the
best interests of the customer, whether or not there was full dis-
closure."21 Even if the broker-dealer had provided his customer
with complete information concerning the security, he probably
could not (because of the customer's senility) have presented the
information in a way which would have enabled the customer to
relate the investment risks of the transaction to his risk threshold and
thus make the determination of suitability for himself. The impli-
cation that a broker-dealer has a responsibility to determine whether
his customer can utilize the information disclosed to him in arriving
at an investment decision echoes a similar suggestion implicit in an
earlier case, Phillips & Co.- In that case, the broker-dealer had
encouraged his customers, who he knew were persons of modest
means and little experience in the market, to purchase stock involv-
ing a high degree of risk. Although the disciplinary action imposed
by the NASD could have been upheld by the Commission solely on
the basis of misleading statements made by the salesman, the NASD
"
9Powell & McGowan, Inc., SEC Securities Exch. Act Release No. 7502 (Apr. 24,
1964).
20 Id. at 2.
21 Ibid. The opinion in Powell & McGowan, Inc. treats the case solely as one
involving the responsibilities of a broker-dealer selling securities. It seems to attach
no special significance to the fact that the broker-dealer was also the issuer of the
security sold.
2237 S.E.C. 66 (1956).
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and the Commission both found violations of the NASD's suitability
rule. This finding was also applied in the case of two of the cus-
tomers who it was alleged had themselves made a determination that
the stock was a suitable investment. The Commission said:
Whether or not customers Z and E considered a purchase of the
stock of Quebec's affiliate or of Quebec a suitable investment is
not the test for determining the propriety of applicants' conduct
in the situation before us. The test is whether Bernheimer ful-
filled the obligation he assumed when he undertook to counsel the
customers, of making only such recommendations as would be
consistent with the customer's financial situation and needs. 23
The clearest expression of the view that a broker-dealer cannot
in every case shift to his customer the responsibility for determin-
ing the suitability of an investment appears in Commission
rule 15c2-5, 24 which governs the sale of equity funding pro-
grams.25 These programs involve the purchase of mutual fund
shares and the pledging of these shares to secure a loan, the
proceeds of which are then used to pay the premiums on an insurance
policy purchased at about the same time. Typically, these programs
are sold to persons of modest means and little financial experience.
The Commission discovered that in many cases they were being
offered to persons for whom they were wholly inappropriate. Con-
sequently, it promulgated the present rule which provides that a
salesman offering an interest in an equity funding program must
disclose certain specified facts about the program (including its risks
and disadvantages) which might affect the particular customer, ob-
tain information from the customer concerning his financial situa-
tion and needs, and determine, on the basis of this information,
whether the transaction as a whole is suitable for the customer.
This determination and the basis upon which it is made must be
communicated in writing to the customer. Rule 15c2-5 thus goes
2"Id.at 70.21 SEC Securities Exch. Act Rule 15c2-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1964).
2r Although rule 15c2-5 is sometimes referred to as the equity funding rule, it has a
broader impact. It applies to every situation in which a broker or dealer, directly or
indirectly, lends money or arranges for a loan to a customer in connection with the
sale of a security, unless the credit extended or the loan arranged is by a broker or
dealer subject to the provisions of regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board and
the transaction complies with the requirements of that regulation. The brokers and
dealers not subject to regulation T are those who are not members of a national
securities exchange and who do not transact a business in securities through the me.
dium of any such member. Fed. Res. Bd. Reg. T § 1, 12 C.F.R. § 220.1 (1963).
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beyond the suitability doctrine as outlined above in that it forbids
the sale of the equity funding program unless the broker-dealer
reasonably determines that it is suitable for the customer. This
prohibition applies even if a customer who is highly sophisticated in
financial matters wishes to purchase the program notwithstanding
the unfavorable recommendation of the broker-dealer.26  Further,
the rule has important implications because it imposes responsibili-
ties on the seller even though there was no prior established relation-
ship between him and the customer. Despite the far reaching nature
of this rule, only one letter opposed the suitability aspects of the
rule when it was proposed for comment.27
A problem similar to that posed in the equity funding situation
has arisen in the insurance industry and was the subject of a 1961
decision of the Ninth Circuit.28  In that case, the defendant in-
surance agent sold the plaintiff and his wife bank financed life
insurance in the face amount of $150,000. The district court found
that the agent had represented to the plaintiff that the plan was suit-
able for him and his wife, and it further found that the plan was
not in fact suitable. In the court of appeals, the defendant argued
that he merely presented the program to the plaintiff and his wife,
and that the ultimate responsibility for determining whether they
wanted the program and whether they could afford to pay for it
was theirs. In a lengthy opinion, the court struggled with the ques-
tion whether the representation by the insurance agent that the plan
was suitable constituted a representation of fact or opinion, and
whether liability could be predicated on the finding that the plan was
in fact not suitable. The court eventually resolved the question in
favor of the plaintiff. Toward the end of the discussion, the court
intimated-and I think correctly-that even if the agent had not
28 However, if the customer cannot show reliance it is doubtful that he would be
able to demand rescission of the transaction even though the broker-dealer's conduct is
defined as fraudulent by the rule.
27 The only comment in opposition came from a mutual fund salesman who signed
his letter "Ernest F. Boruski, characterized as a 'hostile witness' by the SEC for refusing
to go along with their injustice and other nonsense." Mr. Boruski's view was that it
made no sense to impose an obligation on one person to make a judgment about the
suitability of a particular security for another person, particularly when "most people
have no real idea of what is suitable for themselves." Letter from Ernest F. Boruski to
the SEC, June 1, 1962. One other letter commenting on the proposed rule stated that
the suitability requirement imposed by the rule would not be very effective. Letter
from Erich Stock Valicenti, Leighton & Holland, to the SEC, June 15, 1962.
2 Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962).
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expressly represented the plan to be suitable for the plaintiff and his
wife, he could not have assumed that the responsibility for making
the ultimate decision with respect to suitability could be shifted to
the customer in this kind of transaction-involving a complicated
program, a holding out of the agent as an expert in the creation of
such programs, and the relative lack of sophistication of the customer.
The court said:
Indeed, the court might well regard seriously the argument
that any insurance agent who would sell a man with Knox's lim-
ited income and prospects an insurance program that involved
saddling him with a bank indebtedness of $125,000, an essentially
term insurance type of protection, and dissipation of the accumu-
lated cash values of his old insurance, must have known that he
was not acting honestly in making the sale.29
The other type of situation in which the suitability concept has
been stressed involves the sale of securities by boiler-room techniques
-high pressure merchandising of low-priced, speculative, obscure
securities over the telephone to customers who are unknown to the
salesman. In a number of cases dealing with boiler-room sales, the
Commission has stressed that aspect in the boiler-room opera-
tion which seeks to induce a hasty decision by the customer on the
basis of inadequate information and fails to recognize the obligation
of the salesman to determine whether the security recommended is
suitable for the customer to whom it is recommended. 0 In one of
29 Id. at 727-28. The district court also thought that the defendant could not shift
the responsibility for making the decision to purchase to his customer: "Defendant
claims plaintiff was naive or indifferent to the workings of the insurance plan sold.
Perhaps he was. However, the doors of this Court are open to the gullible as well as
to the alert and sophisticated. It could be said that a more reasonable man under
the circumstances might have taken greater care in ascertaining the significance of
the tax bracket factor in the context of the bank financed insurance. Yet it was de-
fendant who conscientiously strove to have plaintiff rely on him in this matter. The
nature of the reliance which resulted cannot be utilized to mitigate defendant's culpa-
bility. The complexity of the insurance plan sold to plaintiff brings us into an area
of the law which has long since seen the demise of caveat emptor. 'Buyer beware'
lingers now only in the argument of the lawyers." Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp.
795, 806 (D. Haw. 1958). See Chittick, Responsibilities of Professionalism, 18 J. AM.
Soc'v C.L.U. 29 (1964).
30 See MacRobbins & Co., SEC Securities Exch. Act Release No. 6846 (July 11, 1962);
Best Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960); DuKE UNIVEsrrY SCHOOL OF LAW, CONFERENCE
ON SEcURITiES REGULAMON 8, 90 (Mundheim ed. 1965) (comments of Manuel F. Cohen,
Chairman of the SEC) [hereinafter cited as CONFFRNCE]; Cohen 9- Rabin, supra note
6, at 707.
Commission opinions in boiler-room cases are written either in connection with
proceedings to censure, suspend or revoke the registration of a broker-dealer under §
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these cases, Gerald M. Greenberg,31 the defendant objected to a
finding of a violation of the NASD's suitability rule on the ground
that he did not have any information concerning the financial condi-
tion and holdings of his customers and therefore was under no obli-
gation to see that the security recommended was suitable for such
customers. The Commission refused to read the words "if any" in
the NASD's suitability rule3 2 as permitting a broker-dealer to avoid
making inquiry about the financial situation and needs of his cus-
tomers. The significance of the use of suitability language in the
boiler-room cases is the suggestion, similar to that implicit in rule
15c2-5, that the broker-dealer has a responsibility to his customer in
the making of recommendations even though there has been no prior
relationship between them. The existence of this responsibility
necessitates inquiry concerning his customers' financial situation and
needs.
Perhaps the Commission's use of the suitability doctrine in
boiler-room cases will be strictly limited to the extreme situation
which they present. 3  These cases typically involve the indiscrimi-
nate merchandising of high-risk securities which will in fact be un-
suitable to the needs and resources of many of the investors who are
persuaded to purchase them. Since such sales are made under
circumstances involving a minimum level of disclosure-indeed false
statements, half-truths and optimistic predictions are the hallmarks
of the boiler-room-the purchasers will often not be aware of the
unsuitability of the security to their needs and resources. How-
ever, the NASD apparently began to worry about the implications
of the decision in the Greenberg case, because shortly thereafter in
a case involving disciplinary proceedings against a large, reputable
member of the New York Stock Exchange, one of whose branches
had been aggressively merchandising a low-priced, speculative, ob-
15 (b) (5) of the Securities Exchange Act, or in connection with review of NASD dis-
ciplinary proceedings pursuant to §§ 15A (g) and (h) of the Securities Exchange Act.
Section 15 (b) (5) proceedings typically allege wilful violations of § 17 (a) of the
Securities Act and §§ 10 (b) and 15 (c) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act and rules
10(b) (5) and 15cl-2 thereunder-the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. In
NASD proceedings, violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Rules of Fair Practice-the obligation
to "observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of
trade" and the suitability rule-are usually alleged.
8, 40 S.E.C. 18 (1960).
32 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
"1 See CONFERENCE 103-04 (comment of Philip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel of the
SEC).
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scure security, it sought to confine the applicability of the suitability
doctrine to those situations in which the broker-dealer has obtained
financial information concerning his customer and then disregarded
it. 34 This interpretation gives effect to the words "if any" in the
NASD's suitability rule and does not require the broker-dealer to
assume any responsibility until the customer objectively demon-
strates his reliance on the superior skill and knowledge of the
broker-dealer by supplying him with financial information about
himself.35
The Special Study, in its review of NASD controls over selling
practices, sharply criticized this retrenchment, stating that:
Under this narrow interpretation of the NASD's own suitability
rule, salesmen might be encouraged to learn as little as possible
about the customers to whom they recommend securities. 0
Indeed, it seemed to desire not only a reaffirmation of the Greenberg
interpretation, but an expansion of the suitability concept. In its
recommendations the Special Study urged that:
Greater emphasis should be given by the Commission and the
self-regulatory bodies to the concept of 'suitability' of particular
securities for particular customers. The NASD, which has taken
leadership in this respect by adopting a general suitability rule,
should provide further definition of content and more effective
surveillance and enforcement. The NYSE, which has less clearly
recognized suitability as a standard of conduct, should make
greater efforts to define its content and undertake necessary sur-
veillance and enforcement. This area would seem to be a par-
ticularly appropriate one to be dealt with through statements of
policy (similar to that now applicable to investment company
selling literature), which can provide the necessary balance between
generality and specificity of standards. Such statements of policy
should cover such matters as: possible guidelines as to categories
or amounts of securities deemed clearly unsuitable in specified
circumstances; practices deemed incompatible with standards of
suitability, such as indiscriminate recommending or selling of spe-
cific securities to other than known customers; and approved and
disapproved practices in the handling of discretionary accounts. 3 T
"See Special Study, pt. 1, at 311-12.
11 This interpretation contrasts sharply with that given the suitability rule by
Harold E. Wood, ex-chairman of the NASD. See Transcript, pp. 59-60, United Staten
v. Pandolfo, Crim. Nos. 95, 105, D.N.D., Sept. 28, 1959.
30 Special Study, pt. 1, at 312.
37 Id. at 329.
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The first question raised by the Special Study recommendation
concerns the desirability of giving greater emphasis to the concept
of suitability. The Special Study had its genesis in the excesses of
the speculative securities markets of the late 1950's and early 1960's
and the disclosures concerning the breakdown in some of the con-
trols over these markets as developed in the investigation of the
American Stock Exchange. Further impetus came from the market
break in May, 1962. Thus, the Special Study was written at a time
when investor confidence had been shaken. One way of sapping
investor confidence is by disappointing investor expectations. This
is a danger inherent in overselling, and the aggressive merchandising
practices of certain segments of the securities industry particularly
worried the Special Study. The suitability doctrine is an important
counter to such selling practices because of the emphasis which it
places on concern for the customer's needs and resources. Moreover,
insofar as it encourages the broker-dealer to discuss transactions with
his customers-particularly to point out the risks of an investment
and relate those risks to the customer's ability to bear them-the suit-
ability doctrine prepares a customer to accept some of the disap-
pointments which inevitably occur in connection with investments
in securities.
The second question raised is whether the Special Study intended
the suitability concept to be defined as an ethical standard or a legal
responsibility. Insofar as the Special Study requested the Commis-
sion to emphasize the suitability concept, it seemed to be speaking in
terms of a legal responsibility, since the Commission could utilize the
suitability concept only in connection with the definition of broker-
dealer standards of conduct under the anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws. The recommendation taken as a whole, however,
suggests that what the Special Study had in mind was leadership by
the self-regulatory bodies-particularly the NASD-in defining the
suitability concept as an ethical standard to which broker-dealers
would have to adhere in observing rules of fair practice. NASD
initiative in this area would be desirable, since the industry itself
could then work out the scope of the responsibilities imposed by the
concept. Moreover, if the industry defined the concept, standards
might be erected without necessarily creating a basis for civil liabil-
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ity.38 However, the Special Study also recognized that in the past
the NASD had not always exercised sufficient initiative in articulat-
ing ethical standards of conduct,89 and it wished to encourage the
Commission to fill the regulatory gap which would be created should
the NASD fail to act in this area. The Special Study did not discuss
the possible role of the courts in defining the concept in the event
that the self-regulatory process did not effectively deal with the prob-
lem.40
The Commission endorsed the Special Study's call for NASD
action, and its staff held conferences with representatives of the
NASD beginning in early 1964 in an effort to work out a statement
which would define the content of the suitability doctrine. The end
product of these discussions was a Guideline on Fair Dealing with
Customers (Guideline), published by the NASD on October 9,
1964.41 The Guideline begins by stating that all NASD members
and registered representatives have a "fundamental responsibility for
fair dealing" with customers and other persons, and that sales efforts
must be judged "on the basis of whether they can be reasonably said
to represent fair treatment for the persons to whom the sales efforts
are directed, rather than on the argument that they result in profits
to customers." 42 The Guideline then sets forth a number of exam-
ples of practices which have in the past been found to violate the
responsibility for fair dealing. The first example refers to recom-
mending speculative, low-priced securities to a customer without
knowledge of or an attempt to obtain information concerning the
customer's financial situation and needs. The Guideline states that
this violation "has particular application to high pressure telephonic
sales campaigns." 43 In effect, this example restates the doctrine
articulated in the Greenberg case. The second example relates to
excessive trading in a customer's account (churning), and the third
'
8 At the time the Special Study was published, only the NASD could develop
standards based solely upon a concept of ethical responsibility. Commission action
-was limited to defining fraud concepts. See text accompanying notes 69-72 infra.
39 The Commission has labelled fraudulent certain conduct which the NASD has
hesitated to label as violating the ethical standards embodied in its Rules of Fair
Practice. The conduct described in rule 15c2-5 and the suitability aspect of the
boiler-room cases provide two examples.
10 For a discussion of the possibility of court action creating standards of conduct
in this area, see text accompanying notes 55-61 infra.
,"NASD Manual G-7 to G-9.
42 Id. at G-7.
3 Ibid.
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deals with short-term trading in mutual funds. The fourth example
of conduct which violates the responsibility for fair dealing contains
five instances of "fraudulent conduct," including transactions in
discretionary accounts in excess of or without authorization from
customers and the unauthorized use or borrowing of a customer's
funds or securities. The fifth example relates to recommending the
purchase of securities where the salesman should reasonably expect
that the customer does not have the financial ability to pay for them.44
The Guideline ends with a statement that a broker-dealer usually
fails to live up to the responsibility of fair dealing imposed by the
NASD when he violates the obligations of fair dealing as determined
by the Commission under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities
laws.
Few cheers greeted the Guideline when it was published. Its
adoption of the principle of the Greenberg case disturbed many of
the people who regarded that case as dangerous precedent and who
had urged the NASD to retreat from it. Further, it was claimed that
certain of the examples in the Guideline seemed to go beyond what
had been assumed were the decided cases.45
Those persons who wished to see the Special Study recommenda-
tion implemented were also disappointed in the Guideline. Not
only did it fail to define the concept of suitability, but it very care-
fully avoided even mentioning the word.46 The only guide to
broker-dealer conduct in the recommendation of securities which
grapples with the problems raised by the suitability doctrine is the
example drawn from the Greenberg case, and it is confined to specu-
lative, low-priced securities. 47 Although the next to the last para-
"This example was drafted to cover the situation where shares in a mutual fund
are sold under a contractual plan to persons who cannot afford the monthly payments.
' CONFERENCE 98-99 (comment of Thomas A. O'Boyle).
0 Marc A. White, vice president and general counsel of the NASD, has stated that
consideration was given (prior to publication of the Special Study recommendation)
to removing the words "if any" from the NASD suitability rule and imposing on a
salesman an affirmative duty to ascertain facts concerning his customer's financial needs
and investment objectives. CONFRENCE 105. See Special Study, pt. 1, at 311 n.175.
However, this was not done.
The NASD membership was informed in a covering letter to the Guideline that
the Guideline made no change in the NASD's existing suitability rule.
"7 The Guideline's emphasis on the low price of the security may be misleading,
because the price of a security alone indicates nothing about the risk involved in
investing in the security. The same stock may be a high risk purchase at $12 and a
low risk purchase at $2, and a so-called blue chip security selling at a very high price
may be a high risk purchase. See GRAHAM, DODD & CorrL, SEcuRITY ANALYSTs 48-50
(4th ed. 1962).
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graph of the Guideline states that the examples given are not all
inclusive, the careful limitations contained in the Greenberg exam-
ple suggest that broker-dealers have no duty to attempt to obtain
financial information about their customers as long as they are not
recommending the purchase of speculative, low-priced securities. 48
Such a conclusion is at variance with the underlying thrust of the
Special Study recommendation for expansion of the doctrine.
Although the Guideline was disappointing, it may not be fair to
blame the NASD too harshly for not publishing a more helpful
document. Any regulatory body, particularly a self-regulatory body,
is limited in the amount of new ground-especially in controversial
areas-that it can break in a short period of time. During the time
that discussions were proceeding on the Guideline, the NASD was
helping the Commission secure passage of the Amendments Act.
More important, the Commission was pressing for NASD action
which would satisfy the mandate of new section 15A (b) (12) for
NASD rules "governing the form and content of quotations relat-
ing to securities sold [in the over-the-counter markets] .... "4" That
section requires that such rules "be designed to produce fair and in-
formative quotations, both at the wholesale and retail level, to pre-
vent fictitious or misleading quotations, and to promote orderly
procedures for collecting and publishing quotations."5 0 Specifically,
the Commission was urging: (1) a change in the system of quoting
prices of over-the-counter securities in the newspapers, 1 (2) improve-
'8 The NASD, in its 1964 REPORT TO MEMBERS, summed up the impact of the
Guideline on the suitability concept as follows: "[The Guideline] calls to the atten-
tion of all members various practices in this area and focuses on instances where
businessmen believed the practices were improper. But no affirmative obligation to
ascertain a customer's resources and needs was imposed upon a salesman nor was
the extremely difficult test of suitability imposed upon the securities business."
NASD, 1964 REPORT TO MEMBERS 8.
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A (b) (12), added by 78 Stat. 577 (1964).
1o Ibid.
51 The Special Study had criticized the NASD retail quotations as not providing a
completely "reliable reflection of the underlying wholesale markets or an accurate
indication of actual price range of consummated retail transactions." Special Study, pt.
2, at 644. As printed in the newspapers, retail quotations in over-the-counter securities
contained a bid price which was simply the wholesale bid and an asked price derived
by taking a wholesale asked price and adding to it an arbitrary mark up-usually 5%
for stocks up to $25. Id. at 634. For the Special Study's recommendation, see id. at
677. On February 15, 1965, the NASD instituted a new procedure pursuant to which
retail quotations are based on representative inter-dealer prices as of approximately 3
p.m. A group of 19 dealers in Oregon unsuccessfully tried to enjoin the institution
of this procedure. Black S. Co., Inc. v. NASD, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,489
(D.C.D.C. Feb. 12, 1965), aff'd, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,490 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 12, 1965).
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ment in disclosures made on confirmation of transactions in over-
the-counter securities, 52 and (3) prohibition of riskless principal
transactions.53 Each of these proposals touched on an area very sensi-
tive to the NASD membership, and perhaps these proposals deserved
a higher priority than a guideline on suitability. However, I think
that the NASD should soon publish a guideline defining broker-
dealer responsibility under its suitability rule. 4
The most serious objection to the promulgation of any such
guideline-indeed to any NASD concern with suitability-is that such
action might help convert an ethical standard into a rule of
law the violation of which would subject a broker-dealer to civil
suit.5  Such a development, it is urged, would be an invitation for
al The Special Study had recommended that "the confirmation of a customer's
purchase (but not sale), whether handled on a principal or agency basis, should pro-
vide an indication of the prevailing spread between interdealer bids and offers by
showing a representative bid quotation." Special Study, pt. 2, at 678. No action has
been taken on this recommendation.
0' For the Special Study recommendation, see id. at 676. No action has been taken
on this recommendation. See CONFERENCE 66-67 (comment of Marc A. White).
0' The NASD's 1964 REPORT TO MEMBERS contains little encouragement that such a
guideline will be forthcoming. In a paragraph headed "Suitability Rule Change Re-
sisted by NASD," the report states: "While the Association was sympathetic with the
idea that all recommendations of purchases or sales to customers be made upon some
reasonable basis, the Board believed strongly that to impose such an obligation on
the investment banking fraternity would be unwise and impractical, and would inter-
ject the possibility of hindsight judgment in determining whether there could
conceivably have been any reasonable basis for a sale or purchase." NASD, 1964
REPORT TO MEMBERS 8.
Although as pointed out in note 13 supra, the New York Stock Exchange regards
its "know your customer rule" as providing protection primarily for its member or-
ganizations, it is also clear that the exchange will discipline registered representatives
for making "inappropriate recommendations." See Special Study, pt. 1, at 239. The
Exchange has not published any formal guidelines regarding suitability. However, a
training manual for registered representatives warns against the making of wholesale
recommendations of a single security to all of a representative's customers "without
thought to each individual's overall investment situation." AssocIATION OF STOCK
EXCHANGE FMss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 11. It also encourages a registered representa-
tive to discover his client's investment objective and, under certain circumstances, to
help him define it. Ibid. Concern for suitability concepts has also been expressed in
discussions on the supervision of registered representatives. In a talk given at a
conference on this subject, Clinton P. Stephens, general manager of Alex Brown &
Sons, stated: "I have said before that you ought to find out the risk-taking ability of
the customer, and this also involves explaining the risks of the securities you recom-
mend, in terms understandable by the customer. I think that many registered repre-
sentatives make the mistake of trying to explain these risks in sophisticated terms to
unsophisticated people." NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON
SUPERVISION AND MANAGEMENT OF REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES AND CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS
80 (1963). See also Special Study, pt. 1, at 301 (comment of Donald Regan, executive
vice president of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.).
O For a good illustration of the way in which the existence of ethical standards
may be used to help construct a duty the violation of which amounts to fraud, see
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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disappointed customers to blackmail their broker-dealers. These
fears are corroborated, it is claimed, by the number of broker-dealers
who, after the publication of the Special Study, received letters
making claims based on the unsuitability of securities which had
been purchased from them. These claims were couched in almost
verbatim quotes from the Special Study or newspaper accounts of
that document.56
A case which seems particularly to frighten the securities industry
is the one in which the "greedy old lady" who has lost money specu-
lating in the market comes into court posing as the "sweet trusting
widow" who has put her life savings into what is now worthless stock
and asks a jury to give her relief against her faithless (and wealthy)
broker. Although the suitability doctrine requires that suitability
be judged in the light of circumstances as they existed when the
recommendation was made, the trier of fact will undoubtedly be in-
fluenced by the situation as it exists when the case is heard-and
everyone knows that worthless stock is suitable for no one.5" The
industry fear of court-especially jury-review of such cases seems to
be shared by the Commission. Its general counsel recently stated
that:
The concept of suitability originated with the NASD as an
ethical principle. That's where it basically belongs.... What it
involves is applying the judgment of the men in the industry to
the problem of what is an ethical way to do business and what
isn't. There has been some suggestion or some apprehension that
the Commission is trying to convert the concept of suitability
into a rule of law. I think that apprehension is exaggerated. 8
Although such assurances undoubtedly have allayed some industry
fears,5 9 the apprehension remains that the courts, which have some-
times gone beyond the Commission in articulating broker-dealer
I' See CONFERENCE 101 (comment of Thomas A. O'Boyle).
r The time at which review of the broker-dealer's action occurs is only one of the
troublesome factors. Another is that the trier of fact will simply see the case as
"Smith v. Multi-Million Dollar Firm" and not understand the business context within
which the transactions were made.
5
s CONFERENCE 103 (comment of Philip A. Loomis, Jr.). Mr. Loomis stated that the
only instances in which the Commission has converted the suitability concept into a
rule of law are in the context of the boiler-room. ibid.
"The industry has been under the impression that the Commission staff desires
extension of the suitability rule as a legal responsibility. See CONFERENCE 105 (com-
ments of Thomas A. O'Boyle and Philip A. Loomis, Jr.).
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responsibilities under the anti-fraud sections of the securities laws,
will not exhibit the Commission's restraint.60
As yet there appears to have been no lawsuit in which a plaintiff
has recovered damages on the ground that unsuitable securities were
recommended and sold to him. Moreover, it has been held that
violation of New York Stock Exchange or NASD rules does not give
rise to a private cause of action-at least under federal law.8 1 Even
though such holdings have occurred recently, there are a number of
suits now pending which seek relief for, among other things, viola-
tion of a responsibility to recommend and sell only suitable securi-
ties. A number of suits involving claims of similar violations have
been settled-in part perhaps because of the fear that a court will
impose civil liability in a case involving an appealing fact situation.
Some persons in the securities industry seem to take the position
that if no one says anything about suitability, the problem will dis-
appear as soon as the suits "instigated" by the Special Study are
disposed of. Under this approach promulgation of a guideline
grappling with the problems presented by the suitability doctrine
and defining its scope would be sheer folly. I disagree with that
conclusion. Indeed, I think that refusal of the NASD to explain
and enforce its suitability rule would increase the likelihood that a
a court would grant recovery in a case alleging a violation of the
responsibility to make only suitable recommendations.
Consider the case described above from the judge's point of
view. The pleadings show that a widow has lost money, which she
now needs in order to live, by investing in stocks which appear not
to have been of the highest quality. The broker on whom she claims
to have relied failed to warn her to refrain from making such
purchases. Indeed, he may have encouraged her. Further, he has
10 One example of judicial willingness to go beyond Commission concepts ap-
pears in the concurring opinion of Judge Clark in Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 114
(2d Cir. 1961), in which he explained his understanding of the Commission's shingle
theory: "The essence of this theory is that in certain circumstances one who sells
securities to the public-who hangs out his shingle-implicitly warrants the soundness
of statements of stock value, estimates of a firm's earnings potential, and the like...."
Id. at 115. The suggestion that a broker-dealer implicitly warrants the soundness of
statements of stock value goes beyond any language in Commission opinions. See
JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 693-94 (1963). See also CONFERENCE 10
(comment of Manuel F. Cohen).
6l O'Neill v. Maytag, CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 91,466 (2d Cir. 1964); Colonial
Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,351 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). For a
discussion of the possibility of alleging a violation of state law for failure to live up
to the responsibilities created by the suitability concept, see note 75 infra.
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earned a substantial amount in commissions for his services in these
transactions. The defense is that the broker-dealer's only duty was
not to lie or .tell any half-truths about the stocks (which he did not
do), and that the decision to buy was the customer's. Perhaps some
broker-dealers would think it incumbent upon them, as an ethical
matter, to warn the customer against making such purchases, but
that is a business judgment for each broker-dealer to make. It would
not be surprising to find a court confronted with this situation look-
ing for some way in which this widow and others like her could be
protected. In the light of existing law-the development of the
implied warranty of fitness for a special purpose, the implications of
some of the language in Anderson v. Knox, 62 and (perhaps most
helpful) the articulation of suitability standards by the Commission
under the anti-fraud provisions of sections 10 and 15 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act-a court might experience little difficulty in hold-
ing that the widow had a cause of action against the broker-dealer.
The Guideline itself may be helpful in supporting such an action,
because the responsibility for fair dealing about which it talks sounds
very similar to the Commission's shingle theory, 3 violations of which
may give rise to private causes of action. The Guideline says nothing
which would support a dichotomy between ethical and legal respon-
sibility in this area.
Assuming-and I do so assume-that it is more desirable for the
standards of conduct under the suitability doctrine to be developed
within the framework of the self-regulatory process than through
action by the courts, it would seem to be essential that the courts be
persuaded that self-regulation is capable of-and is-dealing with
the problem of providing protection for the investing public. The
Maloney Act6 under which the NASD was created sought to en-
courage "obedience to ethical standards beyond those any law can
establish."6 5 It recognizes that the legal process as it functions in the
02 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962). See text accom-
-panying notes 28-29 supra.
63 For an analysis of the shingle theory, see Cohen & Rabin, supra note 6, at 702-07.
6,52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1958).
65 Address by William 0. Douglas to the Bond Club of Hartford, Conn., Jan. 7,
1938. Both the Senate and House reports on the Maloney Act pointed out that one
aspect of the problem of regulating the over-the-counter markets was "to cope with
those methods of doing business which, while technically outside the area of definite
illegality, are nevertheless unfair both to customer and to decent competitor, and are
seriously damaging to the mechanism of the free and open market...." S. REP. No.
1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4 (1938).
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courts may be a clumsy instrument for constructing and enforcing
business ethics. The framers of the act wanted to give the more
subtle instrument of self-regulation the first opportunity to resolve
some of the delicate questions involved in developing standards of
broker-dealer conduct.0 6 However, self-regulation was conceived as
only one aspect of a process of cooperative regulation.67 The essence
of cooperative regulation is that where the self-regulatory process
fails to meet a regulatory need, direct regulation must fill the gap.
Commission articulation of suitability standards under the anti-fraud
provisions of the securities laws is one example of how this process
has worked. Judicial articulation of a standard under which custom-
ers may recover damages from broker-dealers who have sold them
unsuitable securities may prove to be an additional example of how
the process works.
One difficulty in persuading a court that the self-regulatory pro-
cess can effectively cope with the problems raised by the suitability
cases may be the inability of the NASD to make a plaintiff, such
as the widow in the hypothetical case described above, whole by
ordering restitution. Although neither the board of governors
nor the district committees have power to order restitution in
connection with disciplinary proceedings, it is generally recognized
that if a member makes restitution he may be less severely penalized
than he would otherwise have been. This practice seems to be
proper and desirable, and it should be embodied in a formal inter-
pretation. Indeed, the NASD might go further and adopt a rule
under article VII, section 3 of its by-laws permitting the imposition
of a penalty in an amount sufficient to make whole customers who
have been damaged by the improper acts of the member being dis-
ciplined.68 The NASD would then pay the customer that part of
the fine necessary to effect restitution. 9 One advantage in the
NASD assuming the power to, in effect, order restitution is that it,
unlike a court, need not order full restitution. It can take into
68 See Special Study, pt. 4, at 716-17.
07 See id. at 692-728.
08 Under present rules no member or registered representative may be fined in
excess of $1,000. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. V, § 1, NASD Manual D-23.
60 If the fine imposed is beyond the ability or desire of the member to pay, the
NASD has no sanction, other than suspending the member until he does pay. See
NASD Manual H-7. Consequently, in cases involving broker-dealers who would rather
be suspended from the association than pay a huge fine, the NASD would have no
power to assure that the customer would be made whole.
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account the degree to which the customer took reasonable steps to
protect himself and the extent to which the broker-dealer sought to
put the customer in a position so that he could protect himself.70
If the NASD decides to face the problems presented by the suit-
ability doctrine squarely, it should be able to look to the Commission
for substantial help and encouragement, since the Amendments Act
thrusts upon the Commission a type of regulatory responsibility akin
to the self-regulatory responsibility of the NASD. The original draft
of the Amendments Act required all registered brokers and dealers
to join a registered securities association,71 but objections from cer-
tain elements in the securities industry-particularly certain mutual
fund underwriters7 -resulted in a compromise. Under the new act
no registered broker or dealer is required to join a registered securi-
ties association, but every broker or dealer who is not a member of
such an association is subject to direct regulation by the Commis-
sion.73 The act places a responsibility on the Commission, identical
to that imposed on the NASD, of promulgating rules and regulations
"designed to promote just and equitable principles of trade."74
Thus, for the first time the Commission is faced with the problem of
articulating ethical standards-standards that go beyond fraud con-
cepts. In practical terms this means that the Commission must de-
termine whether it will continue to support the Special Study recom-
mendation for definition of the suitability doctrine and whether
violations of the standards articulated should give rise to civil liabil-
ity.
Assuming that the standards which the Commission enunciates
under the mandate of the new act are (at least insofar as they estab-
lish responsibilities under the suitability concept) ethical standards,
70 The suggestion that the NASD assume the power to order restitution would make
it the arbitrator of disputes between customers and member firms, a role which it has
never assumed and for which its present procedures for handling disciplinary pro.
ceedings may not be adequate. The NASD role under this suggestion would differ
from that of the New York Stock Exchange in making available facilities for arbitrating
disputes arising out of the business of member organizations. See New York Stock
Exchange Constitution art. VIII, N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE 1351-57 (1960); New
York Stock Exchange Rules 481-91, N.Y. STOCK EXCH. GUIDE 2481-91 (1963).
71 S. 1642, H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. § 6 (a) (1963).
72 See Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. 1642 Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess., pt.
2, at 836-40, 843-45 (statement of Arthur V. Toupin, General Counsel, Insurance
Securities, Inc.). See also id. at 775-77, 781-83.
7 3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 15 (b) (8)- (10), added by 78 Stat. 572-73 (1964).
74 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15 (b) (10), added by 78 Stat. 573 (1964).
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the violation of which should not give rise to civil liability, it would
be desirable for the Commission to announce its position to that
effect in the release accompanying the promulgation of the rules.
Indeed, it would be helpful and proper for this determination to be
included among the rules themselves.T Once the Commission de-
termines that it can best accomplish its responsibility for promoting
high standards of conduct among non-member broker-dealers by
insulating such broker-dealers from civil liability in the suitability
area, authority for promulgating a rule to that end seems to exist in
the broad wording of section 23 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act
which states that the Commission shall have the power "to make such
rules and regulations as may be necessary for the execution of the
functions vested in them by this title."78
Commission action along these lines might be helpful in sup-
porting the claim that a violation of the NASD's suitability rule
should not give rise to civil liability.7 7 Moreover, it is arguable that
the Commission could adopt a rule under section 23 (a) insulating
NASD members from civil liability in such cases. Since the Com-
71 Action by rule is desirable because a court may be more reluctant to substitute its
own judgment for that of the Commission in reviewing a rule than it would be in
reviewing the effect of a statement in a release.
TO A case against the authority of the Commission to promulgate such a rule might
be posited on the language in § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act which grants U.S.
district courts exclusive jurisdiction of all suits "brought to enforce any liability or
duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder." Since the Supreme
Court has held that this section creates private rights of action, J. I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), it may be argued that the Commission has no power to destroy
any right of action created by § 27 for violation of a rule promulgated under §
15 (b)(10). Although such an argument may be persuasive in connection with the
promulgation of rules defining broker-dealer standards of conduct under fraud con-
cepts, it would not be persuasive in connection with the Commission's new obligation
to look beyond fraud concepts in defining broker-dealer standards of conduct under §
15 (b) (10).
The Commission might be reluctant to include an exculpatory rule for broker-
dealers who are not members of the NASD, because, unlike the NASD, the Commission
has no power to levy fines. See Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1964, 1964 DuKE LJ. 706, 826.
77Imposition of civil liability on the broker-dealer may be based not only on
violations of fraud concepts in the securities laws, but also on the theory that a
broker-dealer's failure to live up to what are thought to be generally accepted
standards of responsibility under the suitability concept constitutes a violation of
state tort law principles. See Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUm. L. Rav. 1147
(1942). Articulation of standards governing the conduct of broker-dealers gives rise
to certain expectations on the part of the broker-dealer's customers. When these
expectations are disappointed and as a result the customer is harmed, he is entitled
to damages. The crux of this theory is that the customer has justifiably relied upon
the broker-dealer to his detriment. Liability need not arise under this theory, how-
ever, if the standard of conduct is clearly labelled as exclusively ethical in nature.
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mission has no specific power to alter or supplement the NASD's
Rules of Fair Practice,78 the authority for adoption of such a rule
would have to derive from the Commission's general responsibility
for regulation of the securities markets and the Commission's belief
-shared by Congress and the Special Study-that a key to such regu-
lation is the creation of a broker-dealer community which is willing
to assume many of the responsibilities of professionalism. If the
promulgation of such a rule would encourage the NASD to take a
stance which would support the assumption of desirable professional
responsibilities by its members, then the rule could be supported by
the broad language of section 23 (a).
The major problem in attempting to provide insulation from
civil liability in the suitability area by means of a rule is the difficulty
in articulating a meaningful line of demarcation between failure to
meet responsibilities imposed by the suitability doctrine and viola-
tions of fraud concepts. In every case in which suitability concepts
have been articulated there have also been fraud grounds for dis-
posing of the case. In those cases there have been lies, half-truths
and failures to disclose with respect to the security involved. Insofar
as the suitability doctrine reflects an attempt to provide a substitute
for disclosure concerning the security there is a tendency for the
fraud and suitability doctrines to merge. The point of merger is in
the area concerning the failure to disclose. Fraud has been implied
where the special relationship between two parties raises a duty to
disclose facts and the disclosure is not made.79 It may be argued that
7 8 The Commission's power to alter or supplement NASD rules under § 15A (k) (2)
of the Securities Exchange Act is confined to organizational aspects of the NASD.
Special Study, pt. 4, at 705-06. However, the Commission has used its power to
review NASD disciplinary proceedings to help define concepts of "high standards of
commercial honor" and "just and equitable principles of trade." See Cohen & Rabin,
supra note 6, at 707-08.
79 See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In its only consideration to date of
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, the Supreme Court took the
view that when Congress attempted to codify the common law of fraud in the Invest.
ment Advisers Act of 1940, it did so "'remedially' as the courts had adapted it to the
prevention of fraudulent securities transactions by fiduciaries, not 'technically' as it
has traditionally been applied in damage suits between parties to arm's-length trans-
actions involving land and ordinary chattels." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). The Capital Gains case involved scalping by an invest-
ment adviser-that is the practice of buying shares of a stock shortly before subscribers
to the advisory service sold by the investment adviser are urged to buy the stock for
long term investment, and sale of the stock by the adviser shortly after the recom-
mendation is made so that advantage can be taken of the temporary market effect
of the buy recommendation. The Commission argued that the fiduciary relationship
between the adviser and the subscribers to his service required him to disclose his
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the suitability doctrine presupposes such a relationship between the
broker-dealer and his customer.
The problem can be illustrated in terms of the "trust and confi-
dence" cases in which the broker-dealer has churned his customer's
account or otherwise abused the relationship. 0 These cases have
been decided under suitability rules and under the anti-fraud pro-
visions of the securities laws. To the extent that they are properly
treated under the latter, these cases give rise to civil liability. The
finding of trust and confidence in these cases rests either on the
fact that the broker-dealer has expressly been given control over his
customer's account or on the fact that the relationship between the
customer and the broker-dealer developed in a manner which re-
sulted in the broker-dealer having de facto control over the account.
These cases (which are properly treated as fraud cases) are different
from those at which the suitability doctrine is directed, because here
the broker-dealer consciously engages in a course of conduct which
is designed to create an expectation in the customer that he may
rely on him to a far greater extent than would be expected in the
normal broker-dealer-customer relationship. Accordingly, in a case
where the broker-dealer has had a long-standing relationship with a
customer and the customer has come to rely on him, it may be that
a court would hold the broker-dealer civilly liable for failure to
make a suitable recommendation or-less likely-for failing to
prevent the customer from making an unsuitable purchase. Such a
case is easily distinguished, however, from the case in which the
broker-dealer has had only minimal contacts with the customer. For
example, although the aspect of the boiler-room cases which involves
wholesale recommendation of a security to unknown customers vio-
lates broker-dealer responsibilities in the suitability area (ethical), it
does not, in my view, constitute the kind of conduct which should
give rise to civil liability (fraud).
Even if a distinction along these lines is too subtle (or perhaps
ephemeral) to support an exculpatory rule,81 there is still merit in
scalping activities. The lower courts had held that failure to make such disclosure
did not violate the anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 300
F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961), aflirmance upheld on rehearing, 806 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 375 U.S. 180 (1963), a conclusion with which the Supreme Court disagreed.
8OSee cases cited note 14 supra.
'2 If the suitability doctrine does represent only an ethical standard, the Commission
should logically refrain from using suitability concepts in the prosecution of boiler-
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promulgation of an NASD guideline on suitability. The existence
of such a guideline (and NASD enforcement of the responsibilities
outlined in it) may, as indicated previously, be effective in per-
suading a court that its intervention is necessary only in a very nar-
row class of cases in the suitability area. More important, it would
provide the broker-dealer community with some meaningful help in
understanding and meeting its responsibilities under this evolving
doctrine.
Outline of a Proposed Guideline
Such a guideline should begin by pointing out that individual
investors have different risk thresholds and that different securities
or combinations of securities are suitable for these varying thresholds.
It should go on to state that when a broker-dealer recommends a
security to a customer he has a responsibility to determine that the
security recommended is within the particular customer's risk thresh-
old. The guideline must make clear the unacceptability of the atti-
tude manifested by one salesman who told the Special Study that the
basis on which he selected securities for recommendation to cus-
tomers was: "Whatever they come in, like a grocery store. Now we
got beans and now we got bread. '8 2 The only time when the broker-
dealer should be relieved of this responsibility is when his only rela-
room cases. The Commission may be unwilling to exercise such restraint, however, in
view of the fact that use of suitability concepts minimizes the Commission's burden of
proof. This point is illustrated in a recent case involving a review of NASD disciplin-
ary proceedings. C. Gilman Johnston, SEC Securities Exch. Act Release No. 7390
(Aug. 14, 1964). In that case the defendant aggressively merchandised its own stock
and convertible debentures (both described in the opinion as involving an "extraor-
dinarily high degree of risk') to a large number of small investors. The salesmen
were, as defendant knew, "inexperienced and unfamiliar with the risks involved in
the securities." No evidence was presented concerning the identity or investment
needs of any of the customers. The NASD's finding of a violation of its suitability
rule was sustained on the theory that neither the salesmen nor the firm had any
reasonable basis for believing that the securities were suitable. Absent the ability to
rely on violation of the suitability rule, it would have been necessary to prove what
was communicated, tie the communications made orally over the telephone to the
.broker-dealer and assemble evidence about the issuer to show that the representations
made were false and misleading. See Note, A Symptomatic Approach to Securities
Fraud: The SEC's Proposed Rule 15c2-6 and the Boiler Room, 72 YALE L.J. 1411 (1963).
Rule 15c2-5 (a) (2), which requires a salesman to obtain information about his
customer and determine the suitability for the customer of the transactions to which
the rule applies, also seems to constitute an undesirable utilization of the fraud
concept if the NASD itself sets forth and enforces an adequate suitability doctrine.
82 Special Study, pt. 1, at 264. The proprietor of the firm in which that salesman
was employed explained to the Special Study: "I think that any underwriting is a
suitable investment, however speculative it might be." Ibid.
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tionship with the customer is that of an order clerk. If a customer
calls a broker-dealer and tells him to buy 100 shares of XYZ stock, the
broker-dealer should be able to do so without attempting to deter-
mine whether that security is suitable for the customer. However, if
the -broker-dealer has had a prior relationship with the customer
going beyond that of serving as an order clerk, and if on the basis
of information which he knows or should know about the customer's
risk threshold he determines or should determine that the security
is unsuitable, he should be required to inform his customer that
he thinks the security is unsuitable. Once he has informed the
customers of his determination, he should be free to sell him the
security.s3
Since the suitability doctrine requires the broker-dealer to relate
the risk aspects of the security to his customer's risk threshold, it
necessarily implies that the broker-dealer must make a reasonable
effort to obtain information concerning the customer's risk thresh-
old.84 The guideline should clearly indicate that the words "if any"
in the NASD's suitability rule serve only to reflect an awareness that
in some situations a broker-dealer may not be able to secure all the
information that may be helpful concerning his customer's willing-
ness and ability to take risks, and that he may have to proceed on the
basis of the information that he does receive.8 5 Under no circum-
stances should the broker be permitted to evade his obligations by
attempting to learn as little as possible about the risk thresholds of
his customers. On the contrary, the guideline should encourage
broker-dealers to establish procedures under which new customers
" When practical, it is desirable to inform the customer in writing (or have the
customer sign a statement) that he is purchasing the security despite an adverse
recommendation by his broker-dealer.
8,Determining what constitutes a reasonable effort to obtain information under
particular circumstances may be difficult. A busy customer who transacts all his
business with the broker-dealer over the telephone presents a different situation from
the customer who comes into the broker-dealer's office and appears willing to spend
a considerable amount of time chatting. The development of guidelines which suggest
how much of an effort a broker-dealer must make to discharge his. responsibility is pre-
cisely the kind of problem to which it is desirable that, at least initially, the industry
(rather than a court, regulator or professor) address itself.
61 If the broker-dealer has no information about his customer's investment objectives
or financial needs and resources it is impossible for him to recommend a security to
the customer. See pages 475-76 infra. That is the precise problem in the boiler-room
cases. If such information is not forthcoming after a reasonable effort, however, the
broker-dealer may sell securities to the customer if it is clear to the customer-as it
usually will be-that he may not rely on the broker-dealer to prevent him from
purchasing unsuitable securities.
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will, as a matter of routine, be asked for information about their
financial situation, and under which such information will be kept
up-to-date.86 The principal aim of these procedures should be a
definition of each customer's risk threshold. The risk threshold con-
cept is broader than the concept of investment objective. Investment
objective expresses what the customer wishes to achieve from his
investment in relation to his willingness to bear risk. Risk threshold
refers to the customer's willingness and ability to bear risk. Choice
of an investment objective is personal and must be made by the
customer, but the broker-dealer should make sure that the customer
fully understands the meaning-including particularly the risk ele-
ments-of an objective selected. This would make it unlikely that
the customer would choose an investment objective exceeding his
ability to bear risk.8 7 The process by which the broker-dealer gets
to know his customer and by which the customer learns something
about the activity in which he is risking his money is the essence
of the suitability doctrine.
Although the guideline should stress the affirmative aspects of the
broker-dealer's responsibilities under the suitability doctrine, it
should also recognize that the recommendation of a particular se-
curity to a particular customer involves an exercise of judgment by
the selling broker-dealer at the time of the sale. The guideline
should make it clear that if the selling broker-dealer's judgment is
subsequently questioned in a proceeding before the NASD's district
committee or board of governors, he will only be found to have
violated his responsibility if no reasoning broker would have
recommended the particular security to the particular customer in
8 One large brokerage firm seeks to obtain the following specific information:
Dollar Value of Portfolio $ _ Annual Income * _ Own Home $ _
Additional Cash Available for Investment $ _ Approx. Tax Bracket...
Age Years To Retirement___ No. of Dependents.....-.. Annual Savings
$ Ages of Dependent Children Amount of Life Insurance $.
Amount Needed for Children's Education $ _ When? _ Other
-Comments: It also seeks
to determine the customer's investment objective using the following broad categories:
conservation of capital with stable income, long term growth of capital-income
secondary, moderate capital appreciation with reasonable income, short term trading
profits, speculative capital gains. See NASD, A Guma To SuPERvlsioN PROCEDu8ES 57
(1964). See also Transcript, pp. 58-60, United States v. Pandolfo, Crim. Nos. 95, 105,
D.N.D., Sept., 28, 1959 (testimony of Harold E. Wood).
87 The broker-dealer's responsibility in the case where a security meets the
customer's investment objective but exceeds his risk threshold is discussed on pages
475-76 infra.
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light of information about the customer which the broker-dealer
knew or should have known. This review must be made in the
light of the circumstances which existed at the time the recommen-
dation was made. Price performance of the security after it was
purchased-whether favorable or unfavorable-should be irrelevant
in determining whether the recommendation was suitable when
made.
The guideline should also suggest ways in which some of the
common but troublesome cases should be handled. One situation
with which the guideline should deal is the case mentioned earlier
involving the "sweet trusting widow" who turns out to be a "greedy
old lady." Typically, the "sweet trusting widow" has opened an
account with an investment objective stressing conservation of cap-
ital and stability of income. At some point-and for various reasons
-she asks for recommendations of a speculative nature which will
permit her to become rich quickly. At first glance, it may seem that
no suitability problem arises if the securities recommended meet the
new investment objective. However, the literal wording of the
NASD's suitability rule suggests, as does the concept of risk threshold,
that the broker-dealer cannot, without more, act on her announced
change in investment objective. The problem is similar to that
which occurs when a customer opens an account and the broker-
dealer helps him to decide on the proper investment objective. Here
the broker-dealer's responsibility to help the widow is even stronger
because of the established relationship between them. Thus, the
guideline should state that the broker-dealer must assume the re-
sponsibility for ascertaining that the widow understands the invest-
ment risks involved in her changed objective. These risks should be
explained by the broker-dealer in the light of her financial situation
as known to him. The conversation between the broker-dealer and
the widow may result in: (1) The widow's return to her old invest-
ment objectives. In this case she would not purchase any of the
speculative securities she initially demanded. (2) The widow's
adherence to her changed investment objective with the broker-
dealer persuaded that she is able-to bear the risks inherent in the new
investment objective. In this case he should be permitted to recom-
mend those speculative securities which he thinks are appropriate.
(3) The widow's adherence to her changed investment objective
without, however, the broker-dealer being persuaded that she is able
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to bear the risks inherent in the new investment objective. In this
case the broker-dealer should be required to inform the customer
that no speculative securities are suitable for her. If, nevertheless,
she insists on purchasing such securities, the broker-dealer should be
allowed to advise her about various speculative securities and pur-
chase for her the ones which she selects. However, he should not,
as long as he thinks that the securities are beyond her risk threshold,
be permitted to solicit her purchase of any such speculative securi-
ties.
Acceptance of such responsibility by broker-dealers would make
good business sense. If the "greedy old lady" becomes the "poor
old lady" because her stocks decline in value, she may turn to a
regulatory agency or the courts as the "sweet trusting widow" who
has been bilked by an unscrupulous broker-dealer. The time spent
discussing any customer's financial situation and needs whenever a
switch in usual investment patterns occurs may prove valuable, in
the event that an action is brought, in showing that the banker-
dealer has discharged any responsibility which he may have incurred.
Further-and more important-such discussions may preclude the
bringing of any action by either discouraging the customer from
making an unsuitable purchase or preparing him for the disappoint-
ment which may result from the purchase.
The primary purpose of the suggested guideline should be to
make the broker-dealer community aware of its obligations under
the suitability concept. An important first step in raising standards
of conduct is the definition of those standards. Failure to provide
such a definition is the major deficiency of the NASD's existing
Guideline. A second objective of the guideline should be to demon-
strate that adherence to the principles set forth in the guideline is-at
least in the long run-good business. The communication between
broker-dealer and customer fostered by the guideline can be a solid
foundation on which to build investor confidence.8 8 The third
S88 An interesting parallel in this respect appears in the doctrine of informed consent
which has recently been developing in the medical malpractice field. See Oppenheim,
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 249 (1962); 75 HARV.
L. REv. 1445 (1962). Essentially this doctrine requires a doctor to inform a patient of
the nature of the risks which a particular treatment entails so that the patient can
intelligently decide whether or not to consent to such treatment. Although the
development of this doctrine was viewed with some alarm, the conclusion seems to
be that the full discussion contemplated by the doctrine "will probably eliminate many
of the disappointments and misunderstandings by patients (out of which lawsuits
grow)." Oppenheim, supra at 264.
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function of the guideline would be to suggest procedures to broker-
dealers which will help them fulfill their responsibilities under the
suitability doctrine. In this connection the drafters of the guideline
should be able to draw upon the procedures already adopted by a
number of firms to meet self-imposed suitability doctrines.
A number of objections may be raised to promulgation of the
suggested guideline. A principal fear is that fullfilling the responsi-
bilities imposed by such a guideline would result in decreased sales.
Aggressive merchandising practices would be severely inhibited; the
broker-dealer and his customers would become more risk conscious;
some customers would be frightened away by the requirement that
they undress themselves financially before the broker-dealer. It may
well be that the restrictions on selling activity implicit in the pro-
posed guideline would make it very difficult to sell securities to a
customer who, immediately prior to the sale, is unknown to the
salesman. The over-all impact on sales which would result from
imposing upon the broker-dealer the responsibilities outlined in the
proposed guideline cannot accurately be predicted. 9 The only
basis for forming any sort of judgment in this respect is the
experience of those firms which have voluntarily adopted programs
designed to implement the assumption of some or all of the responsi-
bilities referred to in the suggested guideline. There appears to be
no feeling that the adoption of such programs has resulted in a net
loss of sales. Indeed, as suggested previously the opposite result
may be anticipated. If the suitability doctrine can foster a feeling
of confidence by the public investor in his broker-dealer-because
the broker-dealer is required to look out for his customer-the long-
run impact on sales should be favorable.
Related to the objection that the proposed guideline would have
an adverse impact on sales is the objection that it would force broker-
dealers to recommend only the more conservative securities, thus
drying up a source of financing for venture capital enterprises. A
number of the large New York Stock Exchange member firms already
have a policy of restricting or prohibiting the sale of low-priced
securities by their salesmen. Although it may be true that imposition
of the responsibilities of the suitability doctrine would result in a
8O Regulation of mutual funds at least has been credited with having a favorable
long-run effect on sales. WIESENBERGER, INVEsTM ENT COMPANIES 17, 38 (1964). See also
CONFERENCE 12 (comments of Manuel F. Cohen).
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decrease in the sale of securities in venture capital enterprises to
the investing public, it does not necessarily follow that a shortage in
the supply of risk capital would therefore occur. Studies made by
the Securities Research Unit of the Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce indicate that at present there is no such shortage,00 and
it is doubtful that to the extent there is a shortage it should be met
by investment from the broad range of public investors.
It may also be urged that the larger firms, more easily than the
smaller ones, can devise programs which will permit adherence to
the responsibilities imposed by the suggested guideline. 1 Thus, the
guideline would contribute to the existing trend toward dominance
of the securities industry by large retail firms which can afford a
centralized research operation and thorough-going supervisory pro-
cedures. The importance of such firms will continue to grow regard-
less of whether the guideline is promulgated. Although increased
regulation probably contributes to the growth of these firms, such
growth is primarily attributable to factors rooted in the economics
of doing business in the securities industry.92 To the extent that the
objection implies that the smaller firms can compete only if they
merchandise more obscure, speculative securities and, therefore, are
more prone to violating the suitability doctrine, the objection can
legitimately be disregarded. The larger the element of risk in a
security the smaller the circle of people for whom it is suitable and
the greater the disclosure concerning it required. The key is the
type of security dealt in, not the size of the firm involved. The
primary focus of securities regulation must be upon protection of
investors. If they require greater protection when obscure, specula-
tive securities are offered to them, such protection should be afforded
go SECURITIES RESEARCH UNIT OF WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND COMMERCE, STUDY
OF INVESTMENT BANKING AND THE NEW IssUEs MARKET: SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS. This study,
which will contain 8 monographs, including one on Price Experience and Return on
New Stock Issues, will be published in 1965. The NASD has recently commenced its
own study to determine the validity of the fears expressed by some of its members that
the newly instituted program of publishing inter-dealer quotations and implementation
of the other Commission recommendations described on pages 462-63 supra would
seriously impair the ability of small enterprises in regions remote from the major
capital centers in the United States to raise capital.
01 On the other hand, smaller firms may find it easier to discharge their responsibili.
ties under a suitability doctrine, because often they have a small clientele who are
well known by the management. The problems which large firms may have in con-
trolling their salesmen are discussed in Special Study, pt. 1, at 268-90.
92 CONFERENCE 17-18 (comment of Charles E. Rickershauser, Jr., California Com-
missioner of Corporations).
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even if an incidental effect is to make it more difficult for firms selling
such securities to do business.
Another objection to promulgation of the proposed guideline
may be that the concept of suitability is too vague to be meaningful.
Although it is true that broker-dealers may disagree with respect to
the particular security which they would recommend to a particular
customer at a particular time, it is also true that they can agree that
the recommendation of certain securities to that customer at that
time would be unsuitable. The, standard of review set forth in the
guideline specifically recognizes the wide latitude to be given the
selling broker-dealer's judgment. The principal thrust of the guide-
line would not be to provide a vehicle for second-guessing the judg-
ments of broker-dealers. Rather, it would endeavor to create a
more professional attitude on the part of the broker-dealer-a pri-
mary concern with the welfare of his customer-and to encourage
more meaningful communication between him and his customer.
CONCLUSION
The Special Study, the Amendments Act, and Commission and
court decisions defining the standards of conduct to which broker-
dealers must adhere all point to the conclusion that the broker-dealer
community will be forced to live up to the professional image which
it has tried to create.93 It has traditionally been hoped that the self-
regulatory bodies will provide the leadership in creating these
standards of professionalism. Although that hope has often been
disappointed in the past, it has been reaffirmed in the many recent
expressions of faith in "cooperative regulation."9 4 Another test of
the efficacy of this philosophy seems to be present in the suitability
area. Developments in the law generally and in the broker-dealer
area particularly suggest a broad consensus that broker-dealers are
expected to live up to at least some of the responsibilities inherent in
the suitability doctrine. Many of the most influential firms in the
securities industry think that it is desirable and feasible for members
of the industry to adhere to some degree to such standards, and they
have adopted programs designed to assure that their employees will
do so. Nevertheless, the NASD, the industry representative, has been
CONFERENCE 1-2 (comment of Robert H. Mundheim).
,CONFERENCE 23-34 (comment of Marc A. White); id. at 41 (comment of Richard
WV. Jennings, Coffroth Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley).
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unwilling to define and enforce acceptable standards under such a
doctrine. As has been the case in the past, the unwillingness of the
securities industry to take the initiative in regulation will encourage
other forces of regulation-in this case the courts responding to the
pleas of private litigants-to fill the regulatory gap. The problem is
that if the regulatory gap is filled by the courts, it may be done in a
manner which may prove much more costly to the industry-and
therefore ultimately to the investing public-than if the industry
itself acts.
The invitation for self-regulatory initiative does not exclude the
Commission. Under the Amendments Act it has, for the first time,
functions akin to those of a self-regulatory body and an opportunity
to participate directly in the formulation of ethical standards for the
broker-dealer community. It should capitalize on the opportunity to
provide effective leadership by cooperating with the NASD in pro-
mulgating a meaningful guideline on suitability.
